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to justify what they do. 2 Various scientific studies show
that death at the hand of the hunter is seldom "clean"
and frequently prolonged. Crippling cannot be avoided
by even the most conscientious of hunters. 3 Even if it
could be known that the hunted animal would otherwise
starve, it is far from clear that the latter fate would be
more agonizing. Indeed, the claim that deer would
starve if they were not hunted is itself questionable.
Associate Professor of Silviculture Bruce Larson from
the Yale Forestry School has admitted that "starvation"
is the wrong term to use: "undernourishment" is far
more accurate. 4 In view of these facts, it is difficult to
see sport hunters as mercy killers.
It is also difficult to see them as saviors of the
environment. As Loftin has documented, most hunted
species would not overpopulate ifleft alone. s As others
have pointed out, habitats are manipulated by such
common practices as clearing brushland and damming
streams in order to produce large numbers of hunted
animals, much to the detriment of the environment.6
Non-"game" animals are of little concern, unless they
are predators who "compete," although not for sporting
reasons, with sport hunters. For example, Alaskan
officials, bending to the will of sport hunters who crave
maximum numbers of moose, have been shooting
wolves from helicopters.? None of this is surprising.
Sport hunters want to hunt certain "favored" species:
the ecosystem as a whole is not their primary concern.

I grew up in rural Appalachia, and now live and teach
college in a similar area in Pennsylvania, the state in
which sport hunting is the most popular. Thus, I have
known many hunters, including family members, and
have taught more than a few. The first day of buck
season on the Monday after Thanksgiving invariably
finds me teaching fewer people than usual. When the
hunters have returned, buzzing with excitement about
record "racks" (their word for antlers) or full of tales
about the ones that got away, I ask them about their
reasons for hunting. I hear much about the glories of
communing with nature, the camaraderie of the hunt,
the exci tement of the chase, and the delicious, allegedly
pesticide-free meat some have in their freezers. Some
of them assure me that they are sparing the killed deer
slow, agonizing death by starvation in the coming winter
(388,601 deer were "mercy killed" in Pennsylvania in
1989. 1). The brightest ones tell me that they are
contributing to the preservation of the ecosystem by
keeping the hunted animals from overpopulating and
degrading the environment.
None of this holds up terribly well in the ensuing
discussion. As Robert Loftin has pointed out, sport
hunters use a numhcr of bad arguments in their attempts
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Loftin supports hunting despite his devastating critique
of its alleged benefits because sport hunters' contribute
financially and politically to the preservation of animal
habitats. However, surely there are other, ecologically
sounder ways of achieving the same purpose. 8
I share all this information with my sport-hunting
students. They are uneasy but remain resistant. When
I ask them if the benefits they cite for themselves (fresh
air, pancakes at 4:00 a. m., aerobic exercise, delicious
food, and companionship) can only be achieved by
hunting, they grudgingly agree that there are other ways.
Nevertheless, most of them will continue to hunt despite
the collapse of their arguments. Nothing else, they tell
me, is quite like it.
My colleague Bernard Rollin of Colorado State
University also teaches hunters. He informs me that he
is much meaner than I am. He forces the students to
admit exactly what so enchants them about hunting for
sport: the act of killing. The students are generally
horrified by this admission. On one such occasion, a
student began to cry. Few of us are heartened by the
realization that we, or our fellow human beings, are
enthusiastic killers. How can activity based on such a
motive be justifiable? How can sport hunters continue
to hunt, once they realize why they do it?
Two recent Environmental Ethics articles in support
of hunting attempt to answer these questions. Each fully
admits that sport hunters kill for pleasure, and each holds
that this is no cause for shame. The authors hold that
activity based on the desire to kill can be morally
justified. I will argue that neither of these startlingly
honest articles succeeds in making its case.
Ann Causey, in her very interesting and often
sensitive "On the Morality of Hunting,"9 dismisses
utilitarian and ecologically based arguments for sport
hunting, noting that the objectives of maintaining
healthy "game" and non-"game" animals, balanced
ecosystems, opportunities for wholesome recreation,
etc., can be achieved in better ways. However, she
notes, the failure of these arguments is irrelevant to sport
hunters: what counts in their eyes is their pleasure in
the hunt and its deadly outcome. lO This very same
pleasure is the particular object of the anti-hunters' scorn
and anger. Causey believes that this passionate desire
to kill can be both explained and defended. I I
The explanation, she believes, is provided by two
very different writers: Jose Ortega y Gasset12 and Roger
Caras. 13 Their suggestion is that the pleasure felt in
completing the predatory act is a vestige of our primitive
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ongms. Causey, a biologist as well as a philosopher,
agrees, holding that primitive humans would not have
survived if they had not enjoyed killing:
The instinct to kill was necessary for paleolithic man. The pleasure resulting from
satisfaction of that urge was also necessary in
order to reinforce the urge and to ensure that
it was fulfilled. 14
The language here is too teleological for scientific
comfort, but it can easily be translated into evolutionary
terms. The claim is that those of our ice-age dwelling
ancestors who were innately predisposed to take
pleasure in killing their prey satisfied their urge
whenever possible. The resultant calories, protein, furs,
etc., gave them a decided advantage over their
nonhunting fellows. This advantage ensured their
reproductive success, allowing them to pass on their
genetically-based predilection for killing. Modem
humans are the result, biologically programmed to seek
and enjoy killing even when it is no longer necessary
for survival. With Caras, Causey compares the joy of
killing to the joy of sex: we want to do it even when it
serves no biological purpose.1 5 The urge to kill is
claimed to be as much a part of our genetic heritage as
the urge to have sex, as is the pleasure resulting from
satisfaction of that urge. As she puts it, according to
this explanation of the sport hunter's motivation, "the
urge to kill may be viewed as an original, essential
human trait."16
If the urge to kill is an instinct like the urge to have
sex, Causey argues, it is a mistake to morally condemn
it. These urges and the pleasures resulting from their
satisfaction are beyond our conscious control. Although
we can control the ways in which we act to satisfy these
urges, and we can even refrain from acting on them
altogether, we cannot help desiring to act on them, and
we cannot eradicate the pleasure resulting from their
successful completion. Hence, it is argued, sport hunters
should not be construed as monstrous sadists. Their
motivation is essentially amoral, not immoral. 17
It does not follow from this, as Causey recognizes,
that the sport hunter's actions can be construed as
amoral, let alone as morally justifiable.18 Hunters, like
rapists and child molesters, may indulge their urges in
morally reprehensible ways. However, the responsible
sport hunter, Causey claims, does engage in "morally
enriching" activity.19 He or she revels in closeness to
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by Professor Stephen Kellert of Yale University, 60%
of Americans do not approve of killing purely for sport,
and 29% of the population object so strongly to sport
hunting that they believe it should be banned. 29 Surely
even the smaller percentage is already far higher than
the percentage of humans willing to devote themselves
to permanent celibacy! In the circumstances, the urge
to stalk and kill can hardly be "an essential human trait."
Causey never considers alternatives to her highly
speculative genetic account. Ice-age hunters would
have been favored by natural selection whether or not
they had an instinctive urge to kill and a reflexive
pleasure response to the killing. Causey claims that
the automatic pleasure response was necessary for the
hunting to take place, but this is not the case. The
avoidance of starvation would have been a sufficient
initial incentive. Paleolithic humans could and
doubtless did take pleasure in the cooking and eating
of the slain animal, and the warmth of the resulting hides
and furs. There is no need to assume that they must
have been genetically programmed to feel thrilled by
the act of killing itself. Of course, many might then
have come to attach pleasure to the act itself, but this
could well have been a culturally conditioned response.
Certainly, no genetic explanation is necessary to account
for the perpetuation of the hunting tradition by
generations of humans.
It is notoriously difficult to tease apart the genetic
and environmental components of behavior, as Causey
surely knows. In Pennsylvania, fathers typically teach
their children, usually their sons, to hunt at an early
age. Everything from fatherly approval and attention
to having one's picture in the paper with proof of the
kill works in favor of a pro-hunting attitude. Even the
current President of the U. S. lends status to the
occupation by hunting quail in Texas every year. AIl
these positive feelings are aided by the attitude that the
prey are "just animals," and as such are of little moral
consequence. It would not be surprising if an activity
perceived to have so much instrumental value came to
be valued for its own sake by young hunters.
Even so, many children resist, as the low percentage
of hunters indicates. One of my colleagues, an avid
hunter, once told me in exasperation that his 13-yearold son had just ruined his chance to "get" his first buck.
Although the child was in a perfect position to shoot
the deer, he did not pull the trigger. "I couldn't do it,
Dad," the boy explained: "he was looking right into
my eyes!" Such children do not appear to be genetically

and appreciation of nature, is appalled by shooting
wolves from helicopters, is very sensitive to the
suffering of the hunted animals, and shows respect and
admiration for the prey.20 Such a hunter actually feels
remorse and sorrow for the victim, even while
experiencing the thrill of the kill. (Causey believes that
the hunter's negative feelings are due to the intrusion
of reason on instinct).21 Sport hunters, she holds, have
a "spiritual" need to maintain a "nostalgic" link to their
distant pasts, a need that endows their activity with
"sacramental value."22 Thus, she believes that what
they do is morally defensible.
In my view, Causey has neither offered a plausible
explanation of the sport-hunter's motivation nor shown
that sport hunting can be morally justified. Let us
consider the explanation inspired by Ortega y Gasset
and Caras first.
The obvious objection to the claim that the urge to
hunt and kill is an essential human instinct is the fact
that a number of humans lack the urge. Some even
have a "counter-urge." Causey herself discusses the
view of "anti-hunters," who "believe instinctively that
it is morally wrong to kill for pleasure."23 Short of
denying the anti-hunters humanity, it seems that Causey
must accept them as counter-examples to her contention.
Causey addresses this objection in a footnote. She
holds that those who lack the predatory urge exhibit
"anomalous or nonadaptive behaviors."24 That is, they
are said to be atypical. Just as damaged, nonrational
humans do not undercut Aristotle's conception of
humanity, anti-hunters, she could claim, are the ruleproving exceptions. 25 Causey later remarks that antihunters would have as much success in converting the
majority to their ranks as they would have in
converting them to celibacy.26 The weight of instinct

is simply too heavy.
This reply certainly will not do. According to
available evidence, the percentage of humans opposed
to or uninterested in hunting for pleasure far exceeds
th~ percentage who are sport hunters. U. S. Department
of the Interior figures indicate that roughly 7% of the
population hunts. 27 Factoring out very young children
and others who lack hunting opportunities would not
much increase the percentage of hunters in the U. S.
population. In Pennsylvania, where there is ample
opportunity to hunt and interest in doing so is the highest
in the nation, only 9% of the population hunts. 28
Moreover, the percentage of anti-hunters among the
nonhunters is appreciable. According to studies done

Summer 1991

123

Between the Species

The Joy ofKilling

programmed to kill. Nor do former hunters who have
become revolted by what they used to do. The ones I
have known do not say that they still have a tremendous
urge to hunt, but that now their consciences will not
permit it: they appear to have undergone a "gut-level"
transformation. None of this fits Causey's purported
explanation of sport hunting.
Even if Causey had succeeded in establishing her
explanation, however, it would not have helped her to
establish her defense of sport hunting, contrary to her
claim. The alleged instinct to kill, termed "amoral"
when Causey is trying to exempt it from moral
condemnation, is, as we saw, later redescribed as a
"spiritual" need and even a "sacramental value" whose
realization should be "embraced."3o (George Reiger,
enthusiastic hunter and editor of Field and Stream, uses
the same sort of language, writing that "the ritual and
traditions, and the emphasis on ethical behavior, liken
this sport more to religion than the sciences we rely on
to help perpetuate wildlife.")3l She wants to have it
both ways, and it is far from clear that she can. Being
"a nostalgic reminder of our precultural past,,32 is not
enough to legitimize the move from "amoral" to
"sacramental." If it were, bashing other human beings
in the skull, at least those who don't belong to the
contemporary equivalent of our "tribe," would be a holy
rite that we should all "embrace"!33
Causey would probably reply that sport hunting and
human skull bashing are not to be compared in moral
terms because humans deserve more consideration than
nonhumans. However, her conviction in this regard is
not well-based. Those who morally object to hunting
can argue from a rights basis or from the rejection of
speciesist views that sanction the hunting of nonhumans
only. These approaches, which are not mutually
exclusive, are rejected by Causey as "largely emotional,,34
and "philosophically unsophisticated."35 Causey does
not justify these blanket rejections, which appear to
confuse the careful arguments of Tom Regan and Peter
Singer (both cited in her article) with Walt Disney
movies and literature from the Doris Day Animal
League. 36 Although she cites a chapter from Paul
Taylor's Respect for Nature in further support of her
rejection of a rights position for nonhurnans,37 that work
actually goes against her view. (Taylor argues that
according to the traditional view, only moral agents
(persons) can have moral rights; but that under a
modified conception, nonhumans (and humans!) who
fail to be persons can be said to have rights. He argues
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that moral agents owe such beings nonmaleficence,
noninterference, fidelity, and restitutive justice.
Although he does believe that it would be less confusing
to restrict the language of rights to moral agents, he
holds that the treatment wild beings are due from moral
agents is the same they should receive if we were to
attribute rights to them. 38 This plainly puts sport hunting
beyond the moral pale.)
However, even if Causey had made a case for
restricting moral rights to humans, it would not follow
that the nostalgic pleasure experienced by sport hunters
in search of their roots morally outweighs the resulting
fear, pain, and destruction of animal lives. Causey
clearly believes that the hunted animals are morally
considerable, although she denies that they have rights.
She repeatedly writes with very genuine-sounding
outrage about the excesses of insensitive hunters, whom
she refuses to call "genuine" sport hunters, since they
lack all respect and concern for their targets. 39 Even
"sensitive" sport hunting exacts its toll, however, and
Causey gives us no reason for thinking that this toll is
justified by the sport hunter's joy. After all, there are a
numberofless destructive ways to seek one's roots and
celebrate one's connection to nature. Therefore, Causey
has neither plausibly explained nor successfully
defended the stalking and killing of animals for sport.
It is Theodore Vitali who, in "Sport Hunting: Moral
or Immoral?,"40 an independent recent article, tries to
supply the needed defense for sport hunting. Unlike
Causey, he is not concerned to explain the origin of the
sport hunter's motivation: he concentrates on trying to
show it morally justifiable.
Vitali has a personal interest in supplying a defense.
As an "embattled" sport hunter, as he describes himself,
he is tired ofbeing regarded as a bloodthirsty redneck.41
It is interesting that Causey herself might be reluctant
to call him a "sport hunter," given her idealized
conception of such a person as one who respects and
admires the animals hunted, feeling a pang of regret
mixed with joy on each occasion ofkilling. Vitali shows
no signs ofregret, and writes less than respectfully about
"taking of the game,"42 "prime game" vs. "poor quality"
game,43 "racks," and "culling."44 He also defends
"trophy" hunting, so long as species or ecosystems are
not damaged by it,45 Causey herself appears to be
repelled by trophy hunting, no doubt because it is
difficult to find any sign of respect in the hanging of
severed heads on living-room walls. In any case,
however, Vitali does provide a better defense of sport
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of predation is the act of killing, and, for the
human predator, it is the intended and decisive
act of killing.53

hunting than Causey. Nevertheless, as I shaIl argue, he
too is unsuccessful.
Vitali writes that basic moral principles enjoin us
(I) not to "will evil as such" and (2) to create "a greater
proportion of good over evil" by our actions. 46 Let us
accept this for the sake of argument. He also holds that
pleasure as such is "a natural good" (by which he means
"a nonmoral good"), as is life itself, whereas pain and
death is "a natural evil" (or "nonmoral evil").47 Again,
let us grant this. Vitali argues that a sport hunter who
acts with the intention of causing death, a natural evil,
and experiences pleasure as a result, would indeed
behave immorally, for the hunter would be willing evil
"as such," and the resulting pleasure would be
insufficient to outweigh this evil. 48 But this is not what
generaIly motivates the sport hunter, according to Vitali:
"the joy of hunting," he says, "seems to lie in the
exercise of hunting skills, not in the death of the
animal."49 The skills used in the "stalking and taking
of game," as he puts it, are said to involve highly
virtuous human traits such as intelligence, reason,
emotional acuity, patience, physical coordination, and
the like. It is this high degree of exceIlence, Vitali holds,
that morally justifies the hunter's pleasure and
outweighs the loss of life:

In other words, contrary to what Vitali earlier claimed,
the sport hunter does have the primary intention of
bringing about the death of the animal, and cannot be
satisfied with anything less. The dilemma he earlier
posed between taking pleasure in exercising skills and
taking pleasure in the death of an animal is now
exposed as a false one. The sport hunter does not so
much crave the joy of killing as he or she craves the
joy of skilled killing!
I fail to see how adding the adjective above morally
justifies sport hunting. Presumably, Vitali could argue
that the sport hunter does not will natural evil alone,
even though it is his or her primary intention to destroy
life: the insistence that it be done skillfuIly means
that good is also intended to result as part of the act.
But it does not foIlow from this that the activity is
moral. Even if one grants Vitali's highly dubious
contentions that the skills involved are "inherently
human"-if animal predators did not also possess some
of these skills (physical coordination, patience, ability
to plan), they would have long since been extinct-and
exhibit a high degree of human virtue-Paul Taylor has
pointed out that deception is a key element in sport
hunting, and this is not known as a human virtue 54-he
has failed to make his case. We are given no argument
for his claim that the exercise of "humanly virtuous"
activity is sufficient to outweigh the toIl exacted on the
hunted animal.
It would not help Vitali at this point to claim, as he
in fact believes,55 that animals have no moral rights for
the sport hunter to violate. His argument focuses upon
the creation and destruction of nonmoral good. He
himself has claimed that animal life and well-being is
good in this sense, as weIl as the pleasure and skillful
activity of the hunter. Although the possession of moral
rights by the animal would be sufficient to make the
sport hunter's actions wrong, the animal's alleged lack
of rights has no bearing on the balancing of nonmoral
goods against nonmoral bads. We still are not told why
the animal's fear, pain, and loss of life weighs so little
compared to the sport hunter's thrill in skilled killing.
If Vitali genuinely believes that the exercise of
predational skills and the resulting pleasure of the
successful sport hunter is sufficient to outweigh the
suffering and death of a being allegedly lacking in moral

Such exercise of human exceIlence, because
it is humanly virtuous, is a sufficiently
proportionate good to compensate for the loss
of life engendered by the act of killing that
completes the entire predational event.50

\)

This defense of hunting is superior to Causey's
because Vitali at least tries to analyze the source of sport
hunting's alleged value and to weigh that apparent value
against the disvalue created. However, it is Vitali
himself who raises an obvious objection to his defense.51
Wouldn't far more good result if one exercised the skiIls
used by the hunter for a nondestructive purpose instead,
like nature photography? AIl the aIlegedly "inherently
human skills"52 he lauds would still be practiced, but
without any attendant loss of life.
Vitali responds that no sport hunter could be satisfied
with such an "ersatz" activity:
The success or failure of these skills, and thus
the joy or sorrow that results, depends
ultimately, and in fact solely, upon the
completion of the predatory event ... The act
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Notes

rights, it is not just animal hunting that would be justified
on his terms. Like Causey, he uncritically accepts the
traditional view that only those who are capable of a
high degree of intelligence and autonomy can have
moral rights. Accordingly, he draws the nonspeciesist
conclusion that "any being" who ha<; never and can
never meet this standard would have no moral rights. 56

I "1989 Deer Harvest Sets New Record," The HeraldStandard, Uniontown, Pa., April 1, 1990, p. C5. (Note the
absence of any reference to mercy killing in the title.)
Licensed U. S. hunters killed 200 million animals of all
kinds in the 1988-1989 season ("The American Hunter
Under Fire," U. S. News and World Report, February 5,
1990, p. 33.) This figure does not include animals killed
by poachers, or captive animals killed by "hunters" using
shooting preserves.

It follows that a sport hunter whose chosen "game" is
feral permanently retarded human children would be
morally justified in stalking and killing them, so long
as great skill is exercised and much joy results! The
hunter would even be entitled to mount their little heads
on the wall, although he or she might then have to be
careful about whom to invite over for dinner. Those
who accept Vitali's defense of sport hunting might want
to reconsider at this point.
In short, Vitali, as well as Causey, has not made a
case for the moral justifiability of hunting for pleasure.
Whatever the origin may be of the joy some take in
killing, acting in pursuit of it remains highly
questionable. It seems that hunter Ortega y Gasset was
after all correct when he mused that "Reason can be
described more appropriately as the greatest danger to
the existence of hunting."57
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33 Unfortunately, it is sometimes regarded as holy by
numbers of religious fanatics. Fundamentalist Moslems who
regard it as their religious duty and honor to carry out the late
Ayatollah Khomeini's death sentence on the "impious"
Salman Rushdie come to mind as examples. However, one is
not obliged to "embrace" their views and deeds.
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A Defense of Pluhar

54 Taylor, op. cit., p. 179. In a different context, Vitali
dismisses Taylor's claim by pointing out that animals practice
deception, too (p. 74, note 9). However, it does not follow
from this that moral agents should do the same, particularly
when they do it for pleasure rather than necessity. Causey
also discusses Taylor on the deception issue, misinterpreting
him by implying that this is his sole reason for rejecting sport
hunting. According to Causey, Taylor would have to hold
that the bow hunter who cleanly kills an animal after a
necessarily deceptive stalk, afterwards making "full,
nonfrivolous" use of the body, behaves more morally
objectionably than the safari "hunter" who runs down the
terrified prey in a Land Rover, shoots it with a semi-automatic
weapon, and leaves the body to rot (except for the head).
(Causey, op. cit., p. 340.) Taylor is committed to no such
implication. His "duty of fidelity" (nondeception) to nature
is only one of the duties he believes moral agents have to the
wild. The overriding duty we have to wild creatures, he holds,
is respectful treatment. Taylor objects to sport hunting on the
grounds that it shows a lack ofrespect to that which we ought
to respect ([aylor, pp. 274-276), not just on the grounds that
it is deceptive. Obviously, the Land Rover hunter who uses
heads for interior decoration shows less respect for wild
creatures than Causey's highly idealized bow hunter. (Actual
bow hunters don't measure up as well. In Texas, only half of
all deer hit by arrows are retrieved by bow hunters. The rate
of crippling and septic infection among umecovered deer is
high. Deer who are retrieved slowly bleed to death, apparently

Daniel Dombrowski
Seattle University
Integral to the defenses of hunting offered by
Causey and Vitali is the claim that human beings are
instinctive killers. Pluhar rightly disputes this claim
on two grounds.
(1) It is by no means clear that human beings have a
basic urge to hunt and kill or that killing animals
is an essential human trait, in that a number of
human beings, indeed a majority, lack the urge.
And as she correctly points out, the paleolithic
humans who doubtless took pleasure in cooking
and eating animals they had hunted may well
have done so because they were hungry; there is
no compelling reason to assume that their
pleasure came from the act of killing itself.
Further, ex-hunters generally do not claim that
they have learned to control a tremendous urge
to hunt, whereas previously they were victims
of akrasia, but rather that they have had a gutlevel transformation such that they no longer
even have the urge to hunt.

in great pain. See "The American Hunter Under Fire," U. S.

News and World Report, op. cit., p. 35, "Bow Hunting: A
Most Primitive Sport," The Animals' Ageruia, May 1990, pp.
15-18, and "Bowhunting Under Attack," Act'ionLine, Aprill
May 1990, pp. 16-18.)
55 Vitali,

56 Ibid.,

(2) It is by no means clear that even if there were a
basic human atavistic urge that it would
automatically be permissible to hunt animals;
likewise, the basic sexual urge in human beings,
assuming for the moment that such an urge is
basic, does not give a carte blanche to the rapist
or child molester.

op. cit., pp. 73-75.
p. 75.

57 Ortega y Gasset. op. cit., p. 46. (Cited by Causey, op.
cit., p. 337).

The purpose of my response to Pluhar's paper is to
reinforce these two criticisms of Causey and Vitali, a

"The Joy of Killing" was written during spring,
1990, when I was freed from teaching dUlies by
my appointment as the 1990 Pennsylvania State
University "Helena Rubinstein Endowed Fellow
in the Humanities."
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